Abstract. The Polish logician Roman Suszko has extensively pleaded in the 1970s for a restatement of the notion of many-valuedness. According to him, as he would often repeat, "there are but two logical values, true and false." As a matter of fact, a result by Wójcicki-Lindenbaum shows that any tarskian logic has a many-valued semantics, and results by Suszko-da Costa-Scott show that any many-valued semantics can be reduced to a two-valued one. So, why should one even consider using logics with more than two values? Because, we argue, one has to decide how to deal with bivalence and settle down the tradeoff between logical 2-valuedness and truth-functionality, from a pragmatical standpoint. This paper will illustrate the ups and downs of a two-valued reduction of logic. Suszko's reductive result is quite non-constructive. We will exhibit here a way of effectively constructing the two-valued semantics of any logic that has a truth-functional finite-valued semantics and a sufficiently expressive language. From there, as we will indicate, one can easily go on to provide those logics with adequate canonical systems of sequents or tableaux. The algorithmic methods developed here can be generalized so as to apply to many non-finitely valued logics as well -or at least to those that admit of computable quasi tabular two-valued semantics, the so-called dyadic semantics.
Suszko's Thesis
"After 50 years we still face an illogical paradise of many truths and falsehoods". Thus spake Suszko in 1976, at the 22 nd Conference on the History of Logic, in Cracow (cf. [25] ). He knew all too well who was the first to blame for that state of affairs: " Lukasiewicz is the chief perpetrator of a magnificent conceptual deceipt lasting out in mathematical logic to the present day." Suszko was perfectly aware, of course, that there are logics that can only be characterized truth-functionally with the help of n-valued matrices, for n > 2. He also knew that there were logics, such as most logics proposed by Lukasiewicz or by Post, that were characterizable by finite-valued matrices, and he knew that there were logics, such as Lukasiewicz's L ω , intuitionistic logic, or all the usual modal systems, that could only be characterized by infinite-valued matrices. Suszko was even ready to concede, in his reconstruction of the Fregean distinction between 'sense' and 'reference' of sentences, that the talk about many truth-values, in a sense, could not be avoided, "unless one agrees that thought is about nothing, or, rather, stops talking with sentences" (cf. [23] ).
Still, Suszko insisted that "obviously any multiplication of logical values is a mad idea" (cf. [25] ). How come? The point at issue is, according to Suszko, a distinction between the algebraic truth-values of many-valued logics, that were supposed to play a merely referential role, while only two logical truth-values would really exist. The philosophical standpoint according to which "there are but two logical values, true and false" receives nowadays the label of Suszko's Thesis (cf. [16, 18, 26] ).
Suszko illustrated his proposition by showing how Lukasiewicz's 3-valued logic L 3 could be given a 2-valued (obviously non-truth-functional) semantics (cf. [24] ). He did not explain though how he obtained the latter semantics, or how the procedure could be effectively applied to other logics. The present paper shows how that can be done for a large class of finite-valued logics. It also illustrates some uses for that 2-valued reduction in the mechanization of proof procedures. Our initial related explorations in the field appeared in our reports [8, 6] . A detailed appraisal and an extended investigation of both the technical and the philosophical issues involved in Suszko's Thesis can be found in our [7] .
The plan of the present paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the general reductive results that make tarskian logics n-valued and 2-valued. Section 3 presents the technology for separating truth-values, which is the cornerstone of our reductive procedure. Section 4 introduces gentzenian semantics as an appropriate format for presenting bivaluation axioms, and proposes dyadic semantics so as to define the class of computable 2-valued semantics. Section 5 obtains, in an effective way, 2-valued semantics for many-valued logics, applying the algorithm from the main Theorem 5.2. Several detailed examples are given in Section 6. The question of obtaining 'bivalent' tableaux for such logics is treated in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 briefly summarizes the obtained results and calls for a continuation of the present investigations.
Reductive results
Let S denote a non-empty set of formulas and let V denote a non-empty set of truth-values. Any Γ ⊆ S will be called a theory. Assume V = D ∪ U for suitable disjoint sets D and U of designated and undesignated values. Any mapping §
Any collection sem of valuations is called a (n-valued) semantics, where n is the cardinality of the largest
A canonical notion of entailment given by a consequence relation sem ⊆ Pow(S) × S associated to the semantics sem can be defined by saying that a formula ϕ ∈ S follows from a set of formulas Γ ⊆ S whenever all models of all formulas of Γ are also models of ϕ, that is,
That much for a semantic (many-valued) account of consequence. Now, for an abstract account of consequence, consider the following set of properties:
(dilution) (CR3) (∀β ∈ ∆)(Γ β and ∆ α) implies Γ α.
(cut for sets) A logic L will in this section be defined simply as a set of formulas together with a consequence relation defined over it. Logics respecting axioms (CR1)-(CR3) are called tarskian. Notice, in particular, that when sem is a singleton, one also defines a tarskian logic. Furthermore, an arbitrary intersection of tarskian logics also defines a tarskian logic. Given some logic L = S, , a theory Γ ⊆ S will be called closed in case it contains all of its consequences; the closure Γ of a theory Γ may be obtained by setting ϕ ∈ Γ iff Γ ϕ. A Lindenbaum matrix for a theory Γ is defined by taking V = S, D = Γ and sem[Γ] = {id S } (the identity mapping on the set of formulas).
It is easy to check that every n-valued logic is tarskian. It can be shown that the converse is also true:
is n-valued, for some n ≤ |S|.
Proof. For each theory Γ of L, notice that the corresponding Lindenbaum matrix defines a sound semantics for that logic, that is, Γ ϕ implies Γ sem[Γ] ϕ. To obtain completeness, one can now consider the intersection of all Lindenbaum matrices and check that = ∩ Γ⊆ S sem [Γ] .
This result shows that the above semantic and the abstract accounts of consequence define exactly the same class of logics. While we know that classical propositional logic can be characterized in fact by a collection of 2-valued matrices, and several other tarskian logics can be similarly characterized by other collections of finite-valued matrices, Wójcicki's Reduction shows that any tarskian logic has, in general, an infinite-valued characteristic matrix. Apart from the 'many truths and falsehoods' allowed by many-valued semantics, it should be observed that such semantics retain, in a sense, a shadow of bivalence, as reflected in the distinction between designated and undesignated values. Capitalizing on that distinction, one can show in fact that every tarskian logic also has an adequate 2-valued semantics:
Every tarskian n-valued logic can also be characterized as 2-valued.
Proof. For any n-valuation § of a given semantics sem(n), and every consequence relation based on V n and D n , define V 2 = {T, F } and D 2 = {T } and set the characteristic total function b § : S → V 2 to be such that
Now, collect all such bivaluations b § 's into a new semantics sem(2), and notice that Γ sem(2) ϕ iff Γ sem(n) ϕ.
The above results deserve a few brief comments. First of all, the standard formulations of Wójcicki's Reduction (cf. [27] ) and of Suszko's Reduction (cf. [18] ) usually presuppose more about the set of formulas (more specifically, they assume that it is a free algebra) and about the consequence relation (among other things, they assume that it is structural, i.e., that it allows for uniform substitutions). As we have seen, however, such assumptions are unnecessary for the more general formulation of the reductive results. From the next section on, however, we will incorporate those assumptions in our logics. Second, reductive theorems similar in spirit to Suszko's Reduction have in fact been independently proposed in the 70s by other authors, such as Newton da Costa and Dana Scott (a summary of important results from the theory of bivaluations that sprang from those approaches can be found in [4] ). Third, it might seem paradoxical that the same logic is characterized by an n-valued semantics, for some sufficiently large n, and also by a 2-valued semantics. As we will see, though, the tension is resolved when we notice that the whole issue involves a trade-off between 'algebraic' truth-functionality and 'logical' bivalence. From the point of view of Suszko's Thesis, explained in the last section, these results can only lend some plausibility to the idea that "there are but two logical values, true and false": At the very least, we now know that the assertion makes perfect sense once we are talking about tarskian logics. Last, but not least, it should be noticed that the above reductive results are quite non-constructive. In case the logic has a finite-valued truth-functional semantics, Wójcicki's Reduction tells you nothing, in general, about how it can be obtained. Furthermore, Suszko's Reduction does not give you any hint, in general, on how a 2-valued semantics could be determined by anything like a finite recursive set of clauses, even for the case of logics with finite-valued truth-functional semantics.
In the present paper we obtain an effective method that assigns a useful 2-valued semantics to every finite-valued truth-functional logic provided that the 'algebraic values' of the semantics can be individualized by means of the linguistic resources of the logic.
Separating truth-values
Let's begin by adding some standard structure to the sets of formulas of our logics. Let ats = {p 1 , p 2 , . . .} be a denumerable set of atomic sentences, and let Σ = {Σ n } n∈N be a propositional signature, where each Σ n is a set of connectives of arity n. Let cct = n∈N Σ n be the whole set of connectives. The set of formulas S is then defined as the algebra freely generated by ats over Σ. Let's also add here some structure to the set of truth-values of our logics. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, from now on L will stand for a propositional finite-valued logic. Additionally, V will be a fixed Σ-algebra defining a truth-functional semantics for L over a finite nonempty set of truth-values V = D ∪ U. Assume that D = {d 1 , . . . , d i } and U = {u 1 , . . . , u j } are the sets of designated and undesignated truth-values, respectively, with D ∩ U = ∅. Assume also that the valuations composing the semantics of genuinely n-valued logics (logics having n-valued characterizing matrices, but no m-valued such matrices, for m < n) are given by the homomorphisms § : S → V. A uniform substitution is an endomorphism ε : S → S. Let us denote by ϕ(p 1 , . . . , p n ) a formula ϕ whose set of atomic sentences appear among p 1 , . . . , p n . From now on, we write ϕ(
Given a genuinely n-valued logic L whose semantics is determined by V, cct, D , we shall denote by L c any functionally complete genuinely n-valued (conservative) extension of it (extending, if necessary, the signature Σ), that is, a logic L c with the same number of (un)designated values as L, but which can define all n-valued matrices -had they not been already definable from the start.
where ⊗ is an m-ary connective and ⊗ is identified with the corresponding operator in the algebra V.
Remark 3.2. Given formulas ϕ(p) and α of L, and a homomorphism § : S → V, then we have:
We say that v 1 and v 2 are separated, and we write v 1 v 2 , in case v 1 and v 2 belong to different classes of truth-values, that is, in case either
(or else one of these two values would be redundant, and the logic would thus not be genuinely n-valued). Equivalently, one can say that ϕ(p) separates v 1 and v 2 if the truth-values obtained in the truth-table for ϕ when p takes the values v 1 and v 2 are separated. We say that v 1 and v 2 are effectively separated by a logic L in case there is some separating formula ϕ(p) to be found among the original set of formulas of L. In that case we will also say that the values v 1 and v 2 of L are effectively separable. . The separability of the truth-values of a logic L clearly depends on the original expressibility of this logic, i.e., the range of matrices that it can define by way of interpretations of its formulas. The truth-values of a functionally complete logic, for instance, are all obviously separable. Consider, in contrast, a logic whose semantics is given by {0, From this point on we will assume that, for any finite-valued logic we consider,
It follows from the last assumption that it is possible to individualize every truth-value in terms of membership to D (to be represented here by the 'logical' value T ) or to U (to be represented by the 'logical' value F ). As it will be shown, together with this assumption about the expressibility of our logics, the residual bivalence embodied in the distinction between designated and undesignated values will permit us to effectively reformulate our original n-valued semantics using at most two truth-values.
Remark 3.6. Consider the mapping t :
( * * ) Now, suppose that ϕ mn separates d m and d n (for 1 ≤ m < n ≤ i), and ψ mn separates u m and u n (for 1 ≤ m < n ≤ j). 
characterizes u in terms of T /F using t.
Remark 3.7. If D = {d} then we simply write x = d iff t(x) = T . Analogously, if U = {u} then we simply write x = u iff t(x) = F . Remark 3.8. For any given logic L, the composition b = t • § gives us exactly Suszko's 2-valued reduction, viz. a 2-valued (usually non-truth-functional) semantic presentation of L. Given a logic that respects our Separability Assumption 3.5, we will see in the next section how this 2-valued semantics can be mechanically written down in terms of 'dyadic semantics'. A later section will show how such semantics can provide us with classic-like tableaux for those same logics.
Example 3.9. Consider the n-valued logics of Lukasiewicz, n > 2, which can be formulated by way of:
The above operations over the truth-values can be defined as follows:
Consider now the particular case of L 5 . Then we can take, for instance: Note that (the reduced version of) each ψ k (x) is as follows:
We obtain thus the following characterizations of the truth-values:
Obviously, the sole distinguished truth-value 1 is characterized simply by:
A similar procedure can be applied to all the remaining finite-valued logics of Lukasiewicz, making use for instance of the well-known Rosser-Turquette (definable) functions so as to produce the appropriate effective separations of truth-values.
Dyadic semantics
Suszko's Reduction is quite general, and it applies to any tarskian logic, be it truth-functional or not. In the next section we will exhibit our algorithmic reductive method for automatically obtaining 2-valued formulations of any sufficiently expressive finite-valued logic. To that purpose, it will be convenient to make use of an appropriate equational language, made explicit in the following. 
Here, w
is a formula of L, commas "," represent conjunctions, and bars "|" represent disjunctions. The (meta)logic governing these clauses is fol, First-Order Classical Logic (further on, → will be used to represent the implication connective from this metalogic). We may alternatively write a clause of the form (G) as 1≤k≤m 1≤s≤nm b(ϕ
A dyadic semantics will consist in a specialization of a gentzenian semantics, in a deliberate intent to capture the computable class of such semantics, as follows. It should be noticed, at any rate, that not all decidable 2-valued semantics will come with a built-in gentzenian presentation. Moreover, as shown in Example 4.6, there are many logics that are characterizable by gentzenian or even by dyadic semantics, yet not by any genuinely finite-valued semantics.
Remark 4.2. (i) Given an algebra of formulas S, an appropriate measure of complexity of these formulas may be defined as the output of some schematic mapping : S → N, with the restriction that (p k ) = 0, for each p k ∈ ats. As a particular case, the canonical measure of complexity of ϕ = ⊗(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ m ) has the additional restriction that (ϕ) = 1 + (ϕ 1 ) + . . . + (ϕ m ), for each ⊗ ∈ cct.
(ii) Let var : S → Pow(ats) be a mapping that associates to each formula its set of atomic subformulas. Given an algebra of formulas S, denote by S[n], for n ≥ 1, the set S[n] = {ϕ ∈ S : var(ϕ) = {p 1 , . . . , p n }}. There are surely non-empty (and possibly finite) families of formulas (ψ i ) i∈I , for some I = {1, 2, . . .} ⊆ N + , and there are 1 ≤ n i ≤ ℵ 0 , for each i ∈ I, with ψ i ∈ S[n i ], which cover the whole set of formulas up to some substitution, that is, such that S = i∈I {ε(ψ i ) : ε is a substitution}. A minimal example of such a covering family is given by {⊗(p 1 , . . . , p n ) : ⊗ ∈ Σ n and n ∈ N}.
Def. 4.3.
A logic L is said to be quasi tabular in case: (i) There is some measure of complexity and there is some covering family of formulas {ψ i } i∈I , with ψ i ∈ S[n i ], for some (possibly finite) set I = {1, 2, . . .} ⊆ N + such that for each ψ i there is a finite sequence φ The reader will have remarked that the above definition of quasi-tabularity extends, in a sense, the usual Fregean notion of semantic compositionality.
Def. 4.4.
A quasi tabular logic is called tabular in case can be taken to be the canonical measure of complexity and, accordingly, for each i ∈ I, one can take φ i s s=1,...,ki as the immediate subformulas of ψ i . In that case, also, the covering set {ψ i } i∈I can be taken to be the minimal one (check Remark 4.2(ii)), and each i can be limited to the equality symbol =.
Tabular logics define exactly the class of truth-functional logics, given that the former logics are always genuinely n-valued, for some 1 ≤ n ≤ |V|.
Def. 4.5.
A quasi tabular logic L is said to have a dyadic semantics in case the set V of Def. 4.3(ii) is {T, F }, and additionally L can be endowed with an adequate gentzenian semantics.
The class of quasi tabular logics is quite wide: Genuinely finite-valued logics are but a very special case of them, and the former class in fact coincides with the class of logics which can be given a so-called 'society semantics with complex base' (cf. [17] ). It even includes logics that cannot be characterized as genuinely finite-valued, as the following example shows: Example 4.6. Consider the paraconsistent logic C 1 (cf. [14] ). It is well known that this logic has no genuinely finite-valued characterizing semantics, though it can be decided by way of 'quasi matrices' (cf. [15] ). In fact, a dyadic semantics for C 1 is promptly available (cf. [9] ). To that effect, recall that α
• abbreviates ¬(α ∧ ¬α) in C 1 , and consider the following bivaluational axioms (where , , − are the usual lattice operators):
As it will be clear further on, in case it is possible to obtain a tableau decision procedure from a gentzenian semantics B for a logic L then B is a dyadic semantics for L.
From finite matrices to dyadic valuations
Let ⊗ be some connective of L; for the sake of simplicity, suppose that ⊗ is binary. If an entry of the truth-table for ⊗ states that ⊗(v 1 , v 2 ) = v then we can express this situation as follows:
Now, recall from Remark 3.6 the mapping t : V → {T, F } such that t(v) = T iff v ∈ D. If the previous situation is expressed in terms of T /F using this mapping, we will get, respectively, systems of equations E v1 (x), E v2 (y) and E v (⊗(x, y)), and consequently the following statement in terms of T /F : if E v1 (x) and E v2 (y) then E v (⊗(x, y)).
In the formal metalanguage of a gentzenian semantics (Def. 4.1), this statement is of the form:
where w n , w k , w s ∈ {T, F } for 1 ≤ n ≤ m, 1 ≤ k ≤ m and 1 ≤ s ≤ m . Now, suppose that v is §(α) for some formula α. Then, using ( * ) (check Remarks 3.2 and 3.8) we obtain:
for every formula ϕ(p). Using this in ( * * * ) we obtain an axiom for B of the form:
for w n , w k , w s ∈ {T, F } etc. Obviously, we can repeat this process for each entry of each connective ⊗ of L. For 0-ary connectives there is no input at the left-hand side; in such case, you should write conditional clauses of the form ( → Ψ). , for any formulas α and β, and any homomorphism §. From Example 3.9 we obtain, using t and b = t • §:
As explained and illustrated above, each entry of the truth-table of each connective ⊗ of L determines an axiom for a gentzenian valuation b : S → {T, F }. We obtain thus, through the above method, a kind of unique (partial) 'dyadic print' of the original truth-functional logic.
Theorem 5.2. Given a logic L, let B be the set of gentzenian valuations b : S → {T, F } satisfying the axioms obtained from the truth-tables of L using the above method, plus the following axioms: Thus, a new 2-valued adequate semantics based on but two 'logical values' can now be seen to realize Suszko's Thesis, through the above constructive method.
(ii) For every § : S → V there exists a b § ∈ B such that:
We now have two notions of semantic entailment for L. The first one, |=, uses the truth-tables given by V and its corresponding homomorphic valuations, whereas the second one, |= B , uses the related gentzenian semantics B. But both notions are in a sense 'talking about the same thing': 
Some Illustrations
In this section we will give examples of gentzenian semantics for several genuinely finite-valued paraconsistent logics, obtained through applications of the reductive algorithm proposed in the last section. Instead of writing extensive lists of bivaluational axioms, one for each entry of each truth-table, plus some complementing axioms, we shall be using First-Order Classical Logic, fol, in what follows, in order to manipulate and simplify the clauses written in our equational metalanguage. Moreover, we will often seek to reformulate things so as to make them more convenient for a tableaux-oriented approach, as in the next section.
Example 6.1. The paraconsistent logic P 
Applying our reductive algorithm to the truth-tables of ¬ and ⇒ we may, after some simplification, obtain the following axioms for b: . Thus:
From the truth-table for ¬, and using fol, we obtain:
Axiom (C3) is again derivable from (C1); axiom (C4) is derivable from (6.3.2). Now, these are the axioms for •:
From the truth-tables for the binary connectives, and using fol, we obtain:
To those we may add, furthermore:
So, if the above axioms are taken together with (C1)-(C2), then we obtain a natural dyadic semantics for LFI1. Two slightly different (non-gentzenian) bivaluation semantics for LFI1 were explored in [13] . 
Now, from the truth-table for ¬, and using fol, we obtain:
Both axioms (C3) and (C4) are now derivable from (C1). From the truth-tables of conjunction and disjunction, using fol, we obtain the positive clauses (6.3.7)-(6.3.10) again, but also:
A dyadic semantics for B 4 is given by the above axioms, plus (C1)-(C2).
Application: tableaux for logics with dyadic semantics
In the examples from the last section we found axioms for the set of bivaluation mappings b (defining a gentzenian semantics for a genuinely finite-valued logic L) expressed as conditional clauses of the form: In that case, it is routine to prove that the set of tableau rules for L obtained from the clauses for B characterizes a sound and complete tableau system for L (check [7] for details). We are supposing that there exists a basic common rule known as branching rule, as follows:
This rule is generated by clause (C1) of Theorem 5.2. In certain cases it may be possible to dispense with such rule, but taking into consideration that tableau rules are not mandatory but permissive there is little loss of generality in keeping such rule. The branching rule is not analytic, but can be bounded in certain cases so as to guarantee the termination of the decidable tableau procedure. Moreover, the variables occurring in the formula ϕ must in general be contained in the finite collection of variables occurring in the tableau branch.
The structural similarity between the tableau rules so obtained and the classical ones is not fortuitous. Applying the above idea to the gentzenian semantics obtained in the last section for a large class of many-valued logics, one can devise two-signed tableau systems for them. Many-signed tableau systems for manyvalued logics, constructed with the help of their many truth-values used as labels may be obtained as in [10] . Here, though, we learn that we can forget about those 'algebraic truth-values' and work only with the 'logical values' T and F , just like in the classical case. While the former many-signed tableaux enjoy the so-called subformula property, according to which each formula α s k obtained from the application to α of a tableau rule as the one above is a subformula of the initial formula α, the latter related two-signed tableaux obtained through our method will often fail this property, reflecting the loss of the truth-functionality of the many-valued homomorphisms in transforming them into bivaluations. We will still have, though, a shortening property which is as advantageous for efficiency as the subformula property: Each formula α s k will be less complex (under some appropriate measure, recall Def. 4.3) than the initial formula α being analyzed by the tableau rules, the only exception being the above mentioned branching rule.
Example 7.1. The following set of rules characterizes a tableau system for the paraconsistent logic P 1 3 , according to clauses (6.1.1)-(6.1.5) of Example 6.1: T (α ∧ β) T (α), T (β) (7.3.8) F (α ∧ β) F (α) | F (β) (7.3.9) T (α ∨ β) T (α) | T (β) (7.3.10) F (α ∨ β) F (α), F (β) (7.3.11) T (α ⇒ β) F (α) | T (β) (7.3.12) F (α ⇒ β) T (α), F (β) (7.3.13) T (•(α ∧ β)) T (α), | T (β), (7.3.14)
Compare this tableau system for LFI1 with the tableau system for this same logic presented in [12] . The latter is based on a non-gentzenian semantics. As a result, (decidable) tableaux without the shortening property (in fact, tableaux allowing for loops) were thereby obtained. As done in [5] , similar algorithmic procedures can be devised so as to provide adequate sequent systems to all the 2-valued semantics hereby constructed.
Conclusions
While Suszko's Thesis is a philosophical stance concerning the scope of Universal Logic as a general theory of logical structures (cf. [3] ), Suszko's Reduction is presented in this paper as a general non-constructive result about the comprehensive class of tarskian logics.
We have exhibited here a method for the effective implementation of Suszko's Reduction by transforming any finite-valued truth-functional semantics whose truth-values can be individualized in the sense of Assumption 3.5 into homologous 2-valued semantics. The specific form of the gentzenian axioms we obtain permits us then to automatically define a (decidable) tableau system for each logic subjected to that 2-valued reduction. The same methods can be applied to many other well-known logics such as Lukasiewicz's L n , Kleene's K 3 , Gödel's G 3 etc. Our reductive method builds bulk in the reductive results from [20, 21] and [1] .
It is an open problem to extend our 2-valued reductive procedure so as to cover other classes of logics such as modal or infinite-valued logics.
